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We study distributive politics inside cities by analysing how local governments allocate invest-
ment projects to voters across neighbourhoods. In particular, we ask whether politicians use
investment to target their own supporters. To this aim, we use detailed geo-located investment
data from Plan E, a large fiscal stimulus program carried out in Spain in 2009-2011. Our main
empirical strategy is based on a close-elections regression-discontinuity design. In contrast
to previous studies – which use aggregate data at the district or municipal level – we exploit
spatial variation in both investment and voter support within municipalities and find no evi-
dence of supporter targeting. Complementary results indicate that voters may be responding
to investment by increasing turnout.
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The concern that politicians may divert public resources to specific groups for their own
electoral benefit has generated substantial discussion both academically and in the public de-
bate. Voters have been shown to reward incumbents for spending, be it in the form of a specific
program targeted to individuals (like an anti-poverty cash transfer, see e.g. Manacorda, Miguel
and Vigorito 2011; Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches 2012; Baez et al. 2012), or public infrastructure
projects (such as a nation-wide road network as in Voigtlaender and Voth 2014). While this
literature convincingly shows that voters respond to spending in the polls, it is generally silent
on whether and how politicians allocate this spending across voters for electoral purposes.
In this paper we use finely disaggregated data to study whether politicians allocate spend-
ing in space in response to the spatial distribution of voters. In particular, we ask if investment
spending goes disproportionately to areas of strong support for the incumbent. For this pur-
pose, we use data from Plan E, a large stimulus program that, between 2009 and 2011, endowed
Spanish municipalities with 12 billion Euros to fund municipal investment projects, ranging
from sport facilities to provision of urban amenities. This program provides an excellent setting
to study distributive politics for several reasons. Firstly, municipal governments had substantial
discretion in the use of funds with respect to both the type and location of investment projects.
Given the urgency to implement this fiscal stimulus, the national government quickly processed
the applications for funding, approving in full over 99% of them (Montolio, 2018). Secondly, the
program had a substantial impact onmunicipal investment. Virtually all municipalities applied,
and the amount they received was three times as large as their infrastructures spending in an
average year. Finally, Plan E investment projects were geo-located by the municipal authorities.
These characteristics of Plan E allow us to exploit within-municipal variation in spending to
study distributional politics.1
Local governments carry out two-thirds of all public investment in developed countries
(OECD, 2013), yet distributive politics studies usually focus on national or, at most, regional
level decisions. For this reason, we have an incomplete understanding of whether the welfare
distortions that often have been associated with distributive politics (Weingast, Shepsle and
Johnsen, 1981) operate at the local level. To our knowledge, we are the first to study the ge-
ography of distributive politics inside cities. What enables us to do this is the combination of
finely disaggregated data on electoral outcomes and investment projects.2 The most important
empirical challenge we face when conducting our analysis arises because the geographical dis-
tribution of voter preferences is endogenous to economic, social and cultural factors. These
factors may, in turn, also affect investment decisions (for example, see Brollo and Nannicini
2012). We overcome this issue by exploiting as-good-as-random variation in the identity of the
incumbent party in a close-election regression-discontinuity design. To implement this strat-
egy, we rely on intra-municipal variation in Plan E spending and in the incumbents’ electoral
support.
1Throughout the paper, we will sometimes also refer to municipalities as “cities” or “towns”.
2Our unit of analysis is the census area. Spain has over 35,000 census areas that have no electoral representation
and are defined for merely statistical purposes. In 2009 there were a total of 8,114 municipalities in Spain and
roughly one in four had more than one census area.
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Weconstruct two differentmeasures of party supporter bias at the census area level (our unit
of analysis), which will serve as dependent variables in our RDD estimation. A good measure of
the extent to which the incumbent targets its supporters should have the following properties.
First, it should be large both when a census area with relatively strong incumbent support
is favoured disproportionately in the allocation of projects, and when areas of weak support
receive little investment. Second, it should indicate a low level of bias in cases of weak support
and high investment, or strong support and low investment.
Our RD estimates show that there is no supporter bias in the allocation of projects within
municipalities. Specifically, using variation induced by elections won by a small margin, we
show that incumbents do not favour areas of strong electoral support. When using our exten-
sive margin measure, point estimates are very small, with our preferred specification yielding
a positive and insignificant effect of 1.5% of a standard deviation of the dependent variable.
Estimates using the intensive margin measure, which captures both the amount of investment
and the strength of voter support are negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Our
results stand in contrast to previous studies which use aggregate data at the district or county
level and find a positive association between expenditures and incumbent support (Levitt and
Snyder, Jr., 1995; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2006). Furthermore, we note that the partisan bias
identified in the alignment literature is entirely absent within cities.
We complement these estimates with an alternative empirical strategy in which we regress
different measures of investment on the vote share of the incumbent while including both mu-
nicipal fixed effects and the vote shares of all major parties as controls. Estimates are in line
with those provided using our RD approach. Because we use the full sample, these estimates
have the additional advantage of having higher precision.
We explore several possible explanations for our findings. To start, our result could be the
consequence of two implicit assumptions in our main empirical analysis: first, that only voters
in the census area that receive a project can benefit from it; second, that all different types of
Plan E projects have the same effect on voters. We relax these assumptions in two ways. First,
we allow investment projects to have spillover effects to neighbouring areas by creating circular
buffer areas around each one of them. In this way, a project carried out close to the border of
two census areas is counted as having taken place in both. Alternatively, we restrict our sample
by concentrating only on those categories of projects that are most likely to have localised
benefits. Results from these two additional specifications are in line with our main findings
and show that there is no effect of electoral support on investment decisions. On the other
hand, we observe that political participation appears to respond to investment: conditional on
initial levels, areas that receive a Plan E project experience an increase in turnout. This result
has two implications. First, it indicates that projects have a localised effect on voters. Secondly,
it suggests that, rather that favouring supporters, politicians may be targeting inactive voters
with spending to foster mobilization.
This paper studies the distribution of public money within the city, hence it lies at the
intersection between political economy and urban economics. An important strand of this
literature asks if political factors can shape local policies. Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) and
Pettersson-Lidbom (2008) study how parties differ in implementing policies in the US and Swe-
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den, respectively, using a regression-discontinuity design. Along the same lines, Solé-Ollé and
Viladecans-Marsal (2013) show that centre-right municipal governments in Spain have more
expansive zoning policies. This literature treats municipalities as units of observation and
therefore abstracts from variation within the city boundaries in both the intensity of policy
intervention and the geographic distribution of electoral support. Our paper contributes to this
literature by investigating partisan differences in policies inside the city.
Our paper also relates to a critique raised by Cox (2009) regarding a frequent mismatch
between the theory and the empirics of distributional politics studies. Specifically, while sev-
eral studies document whether parties target specific districts, they are not informative about
how resources are distributed across groups of voters.3 Most of these papers analyse the alloca-
tion of government funds across municipalities, districts or states (see Wright 1974; Strömberg
2004).4 Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) use data on US state expenditures across counties and
find evidence in support of the core voters hypothesis but no evidence of swing voter targeting.
By studying allocations across geographical areas within municipalities, our paper avoids the
problem highlighted by Cox (2009). Census areas are not districts, counties or municipalities
and have no institutional entity of their own, hence can be treated as an aggregation of voters.
This allows for a more direct mapping between the predictions of these models and the empir-
ical analysis. Overall, our results show that, when studying allocations within the city, there
is little evidence of politicians targeting their supporters. Our setup does not allow us to test
whether Plan E funds were used to target swing voters, and that remains an open question.
A growing literature shows evidence of an alignment effect in the allocation of national
transfers to local governments. For example, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) and Curto-
Grau, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2018) show that Spanish municipalities aligned with
upper tier governments are favoured in the allocation of transfers. Using different research
designs, this effect has been documented for several countries, such as Albania (Case, 2001),
Italy (Bracco et al., 2015), Portugal (Migueis, 2013), and the United States (Levitt and Snyder, Jr.,
1995). We distinguish ourselves from this literature because, in our context, there are no local
administrative units or electoral districts between the allocating body and the spatial voter
groups that constitute our unit of observation.
2. Institutional Setting
2.1. Plan E
Plan Ewas announced in November 2008 in Spain by the PSOE (centre-left) national govern-
ment of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.5 It was a large, urgent, stimulus plan aimed at boosting
economic activity and fostering employment growth in the midst of the economic crisis. The
3A similar point is made in the review by Golden and Min (2013): “The weakness [of these studies] is that
results accord poorly with the individual-level theory that is usually held to be relevant.”
4An exception, using data on city-level budget allocations is found in Trounstine (2006). This is, however,
largely descriptive and does not investigate the spatial distribution of resources within the city.
5Formally, the name of the policy was Plan Español para el Estímulo de la Economía y el Empleo (Spanish Plan
for Employment and Economic Stimulus).
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plan was carried out in two parts, starting in 2009 with FEIL (Fondo Estatal de Inversión Lo-
cal) – which provided municipalities with roughly 8,000 million Euros – and following with
the smaller FEESL (Fondo Estatal para el Empleo y la Sostenibilidad Local) program in 2010 –
accounting for over 4,000 millions Euros. There was an additional and much smaller plan af-
fecting province-level bodies called CN over this period. In total, Plan E transferred public
funds to local government for about 0.8% of the 2009 Spanish GDP.
The actual investment and spending decisions were carried out by municipalities. Once
the project had been approved by the central government, the process followed public pro-
curement rules under the prescriptions of Spanish law. Each municipality was eligible to an
amount proportional to its population and had to submit projects to the central government
for approval. More than 99% of municipalities decided to apply. Over 99% of the submitted
projects – each of which could not exceed 5 million Euros – was approved and received full
funding (see Montolio 2018 for a thorough discussion of the Plan E timing, with details on the
tender and implementation process).6
The nearly universal approval rate reflects the fact that criteria to obtain funding were very
lax. A subsequent report from the Tribunal de Cuentas (National Audit Office) found that these
criteria were generic, imprecise andweakly enforced. This gave local governments ample scope
for discretionary use of resources, even allowing several municipalities to use funds for invest-
ments that did not fulfil the legal requirements (Tribunal de Cuentas, 2013).7 Municipalities
had a short window of time to present applications (45 days for FEIL and 90 for FEESL), which
essentially consisted of a description of the project and a budget. In order to be eligible for
funding, projects had to be new, in the sense that they could not be projects already included
in the previous budget, and works had to start within one month of approval.
A total of 57,850 investment projects were carried out by municipal governments using Plan
E funding between 2009 and 2011. Table 1 shows the distribution of project categories for the
subsample of municipalities that we use in the empirical analysis. The most common projects
were related to “rehabilitation and improvement of public spaces”, which refers to refurbish-
ment of parks, plazas and pedestrian walkways (see Figure B.9 in the appendix for an example).
The second most common type was “equipment and service infrastructure” which is a much
more heterogeneous category encompassing street lighting, improvement of transport infras-
tructure, occasionally refurbishment of parks and sport facilities as well as water works. The
average cost of each project was slightly above 210,000 Euros, indicating that small and middle-
scale projects were common. The Plan E program had a large impact on local government
endowments, roughly tripling the pre-crisis amount of yearly resources spent on municipal
investment.
Projects had to be clearly advertised by installing a large signboard containing information
on the amount spent, the contractor and the expected completion time. The layout, size and
content of these signboards was regulated by law. As shown in figure B.10 in the appendix,
6A total of 19 municipalities did not carry out directly any Plan E project. In all these cases, Plan E funding
was allocated to the association of municipalities instead of the municipalities themselves.
7The lax criteria of the national government in the approval of projects was motivated by the aim to initiate
spending as quickly as possible to attenuate the impact of the crisis.
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Table 1
Descriptives - Summary of Project Types
N. of projects Frequency
Rehabilitation of public space 5328 20.86
Basic services infrastructure 4021 15.74
Construction and improvement of social and cultural facilities 3697 14.47
Cultural and sport related buildings and equipment 2925 11.45
Energy efficiency and conservation 2534 9.92
Construction and upgrading of education centres 1115 4.36
Social buildings and equipment 1059 4.15
Urban sustainability and pollution control 729 2.85
Promoting mobility and safety 695 2.72
Protection of historical and landscape heritage 561 2.2
Conservation of historical and municipal sites 396 1.55
Improvement in public spaces and road networks 134 .52
Other 2352 9.21
Notes: Number and relative frequency for all the investment projects, by project type. Sample restricted to projects
which have correct geocoding information and to the subset of municipalities used in the empirical analysis (see
section 3 for details).
signboard’s headlines indicated that the project in question was promoted by the municipal
government. Given the national coverage received by Plan E, the role of the socialist central
government was also quite salient. However, this saliency did not appear to influence project
allocations. On the first place, there were no differences between parties in the allocation of
Plan E funding per capita. Secondly, it did not lead to local electoral rewards for the Zapatero
government. Finally, take-up was generally high and anecdotal evidence suggests that munic-
ipal governments were eager to receive the funds regardless of their partisan affiliation.8 This
is also supported by the fact that the types of projects carried out by PSOE mayors and other
mayors are, on average, very similar. We will return to these possible issues in detail in section
5.
As table 1 shows, most of the public works executed with Plan E financing are likely to
have geographically localised effects, therefore benefiting voters who live close to the site of
the project. Anecdotal evidence indicates that local politicians are aware of this.9 This notion
motivates our use of the census area, a small area within the municipality, as unit of analysis.
When discussing our results in section 4, we will relax the assumption that the benefits of a
project accrue only within the census area.
8A centre-right politician from Partido Popular we interviewed said: “It was an enormous grant, which many
interpreted as a letter to the three kings” (our translation), referring to the biblical Magi bringing gifts to the
newborn Jesus.
9An interviewed local official responsible for urban planning declared that projects were assigned “[...] so that
they had high visibility in the neighbourhood”. A prominent politician from Madrid, referring to the beneficiaries
of investment projects, added “evidently, carrying out a project entails benefits for the neighbours in the area.”
(our translation).
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2.2. Municipalities and Local Elections
Spain had 8,114 municipalities in 2009. Municipalities are the lowest level of territorial
administration of the Spanish state and have autonomy in managing their interests as recog-
nized in the Spanish constitution. Their functions are partly dependent on size and encompass
lighting, transport network upkeep, public parks, local services (e.g. sports facilities, public
libraries), waste disposal, water and sewage services.10 Municipal financing is based on munic-
ipal taxes (the largest of which are a property tax and a tax on firms) and transfers from the
national and regional governments. Note that Plan E project financing was not part of these
regular transfers.
Spanish municipalities are small, in the sense that functional urban areas or commuting
zones encompass several municipalities at once. Hence, we can think of each municipality as
encompassing one or less that one labour market, with very little to no spatial segmentation
of labour markets within municipalities. This is relevant insofar as we expect the employment
effects of Plan E to move labour demand across all the municipality and not only in targeted
neighbourhoods.
The governing body is the municipal council and its members are directly elected by res-
idents. Municipal elections are held every four years under a single-district, closed list, pro-
portional electoral system.11 The single-district electoral rule is important for our analysis as it
allows us to treat spatial units within the municipalities as voter groups rather than electoral
districts. It also grounds the notion that all votes for a party contribute the same towards the
goal of winning government (something that does not apply in multi-district constituencies).
Municipal council seats are assigned following the D’Hondt rule. The average size of coun-
cils elected under the closed list system is roughly 10, with the number of members ranging
from 7 in the smaller towns up to a maximum of 57 in Madrid. The municipal mayor is elected
by the council under a majority rule and in general this majority is obtained through coalition
building after elections. The council votes proposals by the mayor, who acts mainly as an the
agenda-setter. Given the strong discipline enforced by parties in Spain and the impossibility of
calling early elections, local governments are usually stable. Below, the ruling party refers to
the party of the mayor.
For data collection and voting purposes, the National Statistical Institute (INE) divides the
Spanish territory into roughly 35,000 census areas (also referred to as electoral areas) with
no administrative powers. These areas are defined as a function of municipal boundaries and
population. Census areas are the smallest spatial unit for which we can obtain electoral results
from Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerio del Interior). Given that many municipalities are
small, only 2,278 of them had more than one census area within their boundaries in 2007.
10See details in law number 7/1985 (2 of April 1985, Ley Reguladora de las Bases del Régimen Local).
11See Chapter IV of Ley Orgánica del Régimen Electoral General. Municipalities with populations under 250
inhabitants have an open list system with voters able to express multiple preferences for different candidates.
These municipalities will not be used in our analysis.
7
2.3. Political Parties in 2007 and 2011
The socialist party (PSOE) held the national government between 2004 and 2011 under two
terms of President Zapatero. At the national level, the centre-right Popular Party (PP) was the
main opposition party and eventually took power from the socialists in 2011.
The municipal elections before and after Plan E took place in 2007 and 2011, respectively.
In the 2007 election, the two main parties, Zapatero’s PSOE and the centre-right PP, obtained
comparable results. A total of 36% of all municipalities were ruled by PSOE in 2007, while 39%
were ruled by PP. In 2011, almost three years into the financial crisis, these figures changed to
27.6% and 46.5% respectively. In both terms, the third party with most appointed mayors was
the nationalist Catalan party Convergència i Unió which ruled 5.2% and 6.3% of municipalities,
respectively. In total, the 9 most important national level parties in Spain ruled 89% of munici-
palities in 2007 and 87% of them in 2011.12 A number of smaller, local parties, rule the remaining
municipalities.
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics
In order to study how the geography of voter support shapes public spending allocations
we need disaggregated data on electoral outcomes and geo-located data on Plan E investment
projects. Data on individual projectswere obtained directly from the Plan Ewebsite, and include
the coordinates of projects (as geo-located by the municipal authorities), a short description, a
classification in terms of project types and the cost of each project.
The raw data contain a total of 57,850 projects. Some categories correspond to investments
that clearly yield no differential geographical benefit to voters. For example, spending on tech-
nological upgrading of the public administration is usually geo-located in the city hall but its
benefits go beyond people living next to the city hall. We identify and exclude a total of 6,574
projects which correspond to these categories.13 In addition, for a subset of projects, the geo-
location data on latitude and longitude is incorrect or missing. When possible, we geo-located
these projects manually using address or other location information from the short project
description. In total, we were able to hand code 3,065 projects ourselves. Our final sample
therefore contains a total of 38,353 projects (for details on these restrictions see table B.2 in the
appendix). Project types in this sample and their frequencies are displayed in table 1.
We combine information on Plan E investment projects with data onmunicipal and national
elections. Data on electoral outcomes at the census area level are obtained from the Ministry of
Internal Affairs, the body responsible for collecting and disseminating information on electoral
results. We complement it with information on mayors and their political party of affiliation
12These are PP, PSOE, CIU, IU, CC, ERC, PNV, PAR and BNG. By national level parties we mean parties that also
run in national elections.
13The categories in question are: technological upgrading of the public administration, electronic management,
industrial rehabilitation, efficiency in the management of water sources, management and treatment of urban
waste, repairs in water supply systems and repairs in sewage outlet systems. These types of projects are unlikely
to give any localized benefits to voters, as they are either specific to the municipal administration process, or
are related to water and sewage networks. Regarding industrial promotion projects, much of the related benefits
would affect the local labour market as a whole. The excluded categories amount to less that 8% of all Plan E costs.
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Figure 1
Plan E Projects and political support for PSOE (red) and PP (blue)
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Notes: Points correspond to Plan E projects located in the municipalities of Sevilla (top panel) and Madrid (bottom
panel). Census areas are coloured in red if the socialist party PSOE received the majority of votes in the 2007
municipal election, with the intensity of the shade varying with the vote share. Similarly, blue areas correspond
to areas where the right-wing PP obtained the majority of votes.
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from the same source. Figure 1 plots results of the 2007 municipal elections for each of the cen-
sus areas of Sevilla and Madrid, together with the distribution of Plan E projects. Red areas are
those where left-wing PSOE was the most voted party while blue indicates areas of PP majority.
We can see that the support for both parties varies significantly across neighbourhoods. This
within-city variation in electoral support will be instrumental to study the link between the
geography of voter support and the allocation of Plan E projects in the following sections.
Finally, we integrate our dataset with municipal and census area level information from
INE (the national statistical office) and from the 2001 Population Census. Census data includes
characteristics at the census areas level such as population and density, together with the frac-
tions of college graduates, unemployed, home-owners, foreigners, the number of children, and
elderly residents. To control for possible factors affecting the local demand for investment, we
also use information on the number of households that reported the presence of crime and a
lack of green areas in the neighbourhood. Lastly, we also include the fraction of urban discon-
tinuous terrain at the census area level (obtained from Corine Land Cover).
We limit our analysis to municipalities having at least two census areas. This is essential in
order to have variation in vote shares within each municipality. By doing so, we exclude small
towns, restricting our sample to 2,278 municipalities. We will further restrict our analysis to
municipalities ruled in 2007 by one of the 9 national level parties with most mayors. We impose
this restriction in order to ensure we can correctly match the party names in the census area
electoral data with those appearing in the data on mayors. Our final sample is composed of
2,046 municipalities which include a total of 28,083 census areas.
Table 2 includes some descriptive statistics for the census areas in our sample. As Panel
A shows, the average census area has a surface area of about 8 squared kilometres, and 1,400
inhabitants, of which 1,100 are eligible to vote. Given that these areas are designed to contain
comparable numbers of voters, there is substantial variation in their physical size, matching the
variation in densities, from large cities with small census areas to sparsely populated and ex-
tended countryside villages with large ones. Panel B indicates that 40% of census areas received
at least one Plan E project, with a corresponding average investment per capita of 215 Euros.
Finally, the last panel of table 2 shows some average figures from the 2001 Population Census
variables that will be used as controls in our main specification. Descriptives at the municipal
level are reported in table B.1 in the appendix.
4. Empirical Analysis
In this section we test whether incumbent local politicians target their own supporters in
the allocation of Plan E investment projects. To understand our empirical strategy, consider
the following thought experiment. There are several cities, each ruled by either party A or
party B. Each city is composed of neighbourhoods, which can support party A or B. We define
a local government as favouring its supporters if it disproportionately allocates investment to
its neighbourhoods, neglecting neighbourhoods of the opposing party.
If parties are not assigned randomly, observing that certain areas are favoured may be the
result of inherent differences between cities beyond the identity of the ruling party. For exam-
ple, suppose cities ruled by party A are more likely to have parks and that party A supporters
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Table 2
Descriptives - Census area level data
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
A. General information
Surface (2007, km2) 8.41 34.69 0.004 1125.112
Density (2007, 1000 inh./km2) 19.86 21.55 0.001 349.804
Population (2007) 1,423 563.75 294 12,859
Eligible voters (2007) 1,100 441.03 226 10,881
Turnout (2007) 0.61 0.12 0.085 0.922
Turnout (2011) 0.62 0.10 0.157 1.000
B. Plan E projects
Indicator for receiving 1+ projects 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
N. of projects received 0.91 1.72 0.00 49.00
Investment in projects (Euros per capita) 214.76 713.16 0.00 33420.26
C. Population Census information (2001)
Higher education 0.12 0.10 0.000 0.556
Home owners 0.84 0.12 0.004 1.000
Foreigners 0.04 0.05 0.000 0.811
Households with 1+ unemployed 0.16 0.07 0.003 0.730
Households reporting not enough green areas 0.38 0.24 0.000 0.993
Households reporting crime is high 0.24 0.19 0.000 0.977
People 0-16 yrs. 0.15 0.05 0.031 0.394
People 16-64 yrs. 0.67 0.05 0.280 0.927
People 65+ yrs. 0.17 0.08 0.006 0.654
Observations 28,083
Notes: Panel A reports averages for some characteristics of interest for the 28,083 census areas in the sample
(2,046 municipalities). Turnout figures refer to the 2007 and 2011 municipal elections, respectively. Panel B shows
descriptives for the Plan E investment program, and panel C shows data from the 2001 Population Census. These
variables measure, for a given census area, the fraction of people with a particular characteristic at the time of the
Census. In some categories – explicitly indicated – the unit of observation is the household and not the individual.
prefer to live close to parks. If parks need recurring investments, we would observe a spend-
ing bias towards party A neighbourhoods even if these local governments had no intention
to favour their supporters. The randomisation of the party in office would instead guarantee
that all municipal characteristics are balanced. In this case, a comparison of the allocations
between municipalities would be free of the bias induced by omitted variables correlated with
the location of voters. This comparison could then be used to detect the presence of supporter
bias.14
Let us translate this thought experiment into our context. In the first place, our “neigh-
bourhoods” will be census areas and we will use previous votes shares at the census area level
14In principle, it is possible that mayors favour their neighbourhoods not to reward their voters, but simply in
accordance with their preferences. For instance, socialist mayors might favour socialist areas not because they
want to favour their supporters, but because their residents are poorer than average. Just like in other studies on
distributive politics, one needs to take this caveat into account when interpreting the estimates.
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as a measure of support for different parties within cities. Secondly, the assignment of Plan E
projects in space will be used to determine which census areas receive more resources. Finally,
we exploit quasi-random variation in the identity of the ruling party by implementing a close-
election regression-discontinuity design (or RDD, see, e.g., Lee 2008). For this purpose, we need
to select a reference party and measure to what extent areas supporting this party are favoured
in the allocation of resources when this party wins an election by a narrow margin. We select
the center-left PSOE as our reference party because this was the party with most mayors in our
2007 sample.15
To implement a regression-discontinuity design, we need to define both a running variable
and a census-area level variable measuring whether PSOE voters are favoured in the allocation
of investment. Regarding the former, the standard used in the literature is the margin of victory
of the reference party (e.g., Lee 2008; Beland 2015). This would be appropriate in the context of
direct election of mayors. However, in a multi-party system with indirect election of mayors,
the margin of victory is not an appropriate measure of closeness of an election. Instead, we
adapt Fiva, Folke and Sørensen (2018)’s procedure (which draws on the insights by Folke 2014)
and construct our running variable by computing the vote share distance to a PSOE seats major-
ity in the local council. Tomeasure favouritism towards PSOE voters, we construct two different
measures combining information on Plan E investments and the PSOE vote share. These will be
designed to capture both intensive and extensive margins in allocations and voter preferences.
We turn to these issues in the following. In the final part of this section, we also consider an
alternative estimation method that does not rely on close elections and yields similar results.
4.1. Close-Elections Regression-Discontinuity Design
The first step to implement our RD strategy is to construct a running variable that measures
the closeness of the municipal election. Given the electoral system prevailing in Spain, we
follow the method described in Fiva, Folke and Sørensen (2018) as subsequently adapted by
Curto-Grau, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2018) to the Spanish setting. As an illustration of
the procedure, assume that, after the election, PSOE obtained the majority of seats in a given
municipality.16 The running variable is constructed using an iterative procedure as follows.
First, we reduce the vote share of PSOE by a small amount (in our case, we used 0.25%), and
redistribute the corresponding votes among the other parties, proportionally to their initial
vote shares. Then, we calculate the new distribution of seats using the D’Hondt rule. If the
seats majority did not change, we decrease the vote share by an additional 0.25%, iterating the
procedure until a change in the majority is reached. The change in the vote share needed to
reach a majority change is the value of our running variable for the municipality in question,
henceforth simply the PSOE winning margin. In this particular example, the winning margin
is positive because PSOE started with a seat majority. In municipalities where PSOE did not
15Note that the choice of the reference party is somewhat arbitrary and should only have a minor effect in
estimation. In a two party system, this choice is without loss of generality as the estimated effects are obtained
from differences between the two parties (for example, in US studies such as Beland 2015, the reference party
is usually the Democratic party). Unreported estimates using right-wing PP as the reference party yield similar
results.
16We say PSOE has a majority when it has strictly more seats than any other party in the municipal council.
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have a majority to start with, we proceed in the opposite way, adding votes until a majority is
reached. In these cases the winning margin variable is negative. We perform these calculations
for all municipalities in our sample.
Figure 2 shows that, as expected, the winning margin ranges from -0.5 to 0.5. Furthermore,
it does not appear to jump discontinuously around zero, suggesting that there is no systematic
manipulation around the threshold where the seats majority change. The absence of a disconti-
nuity in the distribution of the running variable is evidence in support of one of the fundamental
RDD assumptions, namely that parties are unable to perfectly manipulate electoral outcomes
(Lee, 2008; McCrary, 2008). A formal McCrary test for the absence of a discontinuity yields a
p-value of 0.16. Using Cattaneo, Jansson and Ma (2016)’s RD manipulation test, however, we
fail to reject the null with a p-value of 0.51. Both provide formal grounding to the assumption
of absence of manipulation at the threshold.
Figure 2
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Notes: Histogram of municipal level PSOE winning margin for all municipalities in the sample, defined as the
PSOE vote share change necessary for PSOE to win the seat majority in the municipal council (details in the text).
Positive values correspond to municipalities in which PSOE obtained the majority of seats in the 2007 elections.
Negative values correspond to municipalities in which PSOE did not obtain the majority in 2007. Test of no per-
fect manipulation as in McCrary (2008) leads to a p-value of 0.16. Alternatively, the test proposed in Cattaneo,
Jansson and Ma (2016) yields a p-value of 0.51.
Because of the indirect election of mayors in Spain, obtaining the majority of seats does
not necessarily lead to mayoralty. Therefore we need to implement a fuzzy RDD, in which
the indicator for a PSOE mayor is instrumented by an indicator for the winning margin being
positive (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). The corresponding first stage is as follows:






where PSOEm is a dummy taking value 1 if PSOE is in power in municipality m by the time
Plan E was carried out, WinMarginPSOEm > 0 is a dummy taking value 1 if PSOE ob-
tained the majority of seats in the 2007 municipal elections and f(PSOE WinMarginm) is
a polynomial in the winning margin. Xcm is a vector of census-area level controls including
the logarithm of population, census area density and surface, the fraction of urban discontin-
uous terrain, the distance from the municipal centroid, and a set of control variables from the
2001 Census.17 We will report estimates of two types. First, we use the full sample control-
ling for third degree global polynomials in the running variable. Second, we apply the optimal
bandwidth selector by Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) (henceforth CCT) to restrict the
sample to observations close to the threshold, and use linear control functions in the forcing
variable on either side. Given that local linear regression estimators have more attractive prop-
erties for discontinuity estimates, this is our preferred specification (Gelman and Imbens, 2014).
In all specifications in this section, we weight each observation by the inverse of the number
of census areas so that each municipality has the same weight.18 Figure 3 shows that the prob-
ability of a PSOE government jumps discontinuously around the winning margin threshold.
First-stage regressions using different bandwidths are provided in table B.3 in the appendix
and confirm our instrument is strong, with F-statistics above 30 in all cases.
Figure 3
First Stage Discontinuity
Notes: The vertical axis measures the probability of having a PSOE mayor and horizontal axis measures the
winning margin of PSOE in the 2007 municipal elections, as defined in the text. Positive values indicate the mu-
nicipality had a PSOE seat majority and negative values indicate it did not. Solid lines represent fitted values
from a local polynomial smooth regression estimated with an Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth calculated
using Silverman’s rule-of-thumb.
17Specifically, the fraction of individuals who are unemployed, foreign-born, college-educated, aged 0-16, aged
16-64; the fraction of households reporting crime is an issue, lack of green areas, or owning a home.
18In practice the weighting is implemented using the inverse of the number of census areas as “analytical
weights” in STATA 14, the software used in estimation. The rdbwselect command that calculates the Calonico,
Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) optimal bandwidth also allows for weights. Weighting observations by the ratio of
the population in the census area and the municipal population yields very similar results.
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Before moving on to the definition of the dependent variable, we present some evidence
in favour of the continuity assumption required for the validity of RDD in figure 4. This fig-
ure shows the averages for several census area characteristics calculated in bins of 1% of the
winning margin, together with fitted values from a local linear regression.19 On average, the
observed discontinuities at the threshold are relatively small in magnitude, with only surface
and homeownership rates exhibiting a jump of around a third of a standard deviation. These re-
sults suggest that municipalities where PSOE barely won the elections are comparable, in terms
of observables characteristics, to those where PSOE barely lost. Table 3 shows discontinuity es-
timates for each covariate using our main specification, which uses a local linear regression
allowing for a different slope at either side of the threshold. The bandwidth is calculated using
the CCTmethod on ourmain specification (of equation 2 below) and is equal to 9.6%. Regression
results are consistent with the graphical evidence, and only one of the estimates is statistically
significant at the 10% level.
Table 3
Regression results for the balance of covariates
Population Surface Density Crime Unemployed No green
PSOE majority 0.135 -0.069 0.086* 0.068 0.115 -0.076
(0.110) (0.165) (0.051) (0.068) (0.156) (0.105)
R
2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Observations 13314 13315 13314 13315 13315 13315
Homeowners Foreigners College ed. Aged 0-16 Aged 16-64 Aged 65+
PSOE majority -0.110 -0.053 0.037 -0.047 0.151 -0.080
(0.080) (0.115) (0.052) (0.089) (0.113) (0.108)
R
2 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Observations 13315 13315 13315 13315 13315 13315
Notes: Census-area level regressions. Coefficients are the estimated jumps in each covariate at the threshold of
winning margin equal to zero, using a local linear regression with bandwidth equal to 9.6% at each side, chosen
applying the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) method on equation 2 using the extensive bias measure.
Population is in logarithms. All variables are measured at the census area level and standardized to have zero mean
and unit variance. Each observation is weighted by the inverse of the number of census areas in the municipality.
Results using different bandwidths are analogous. S.e. are heteroskedasticity-robust.
To implement the RD design, we need to construct a measure of “supporter bias” at the
census area level. Given that our analysis is at the census area level but the RDD provides ex-
ogenous variation in the “treatment” (the identity of the mayor) only at the municipal level, we
need this measure to have certain properties. First, it should be large when a census area with
relatively strong PSOE support is favoured disproportionately in the allocation of projects (and,
conversely, when areas of weak support receive low investment). Second, it should indicate a
low level of bias in cases of weak support and high investment (and, conversely, strong sup-
port and low investment). A variable with these properties would pick up the disproportionate
19Variables are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance for ease of interpretation.
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PSOE Winning Margin
Aged 65+
Notes: Balancing checks for each covariate used in the RDD estimation. Population, surface, and density are in
logarithms. All variables are municipal averages across census areas and standardized to have zero mean and
unit variance. Dots are averages within intervals of 1% of the winning margin. Solid lines represent fitted values
from a local linear regression estimated with an Epanechnikov kernel and bandwidth calculated using Silverman’s
rule-of-thumb.
allocation of projects to (or away from) PSOE areas.
We consider two alternatives. The first measure is meant to capture the extensive margin
of investment, that is, the discrete decision of whether to invest or not in areas with many
supporters. This measure, which we denote as ExtensiveBiascm, is defined as the interaction
of a variable that equals one if census area c in municipality m received at least one Plan E
project (and -1 otherwise) and a variable that equals one if the PSOE vote share in this area is
higher that the PSOE vote share in themunicipality (and -1 otherwise). Using a negative number
instead of the zero in the definition of these two indicator variables allows the resulting bias
measure to be symmetric, being positive when a supporter bias exists and negative when it
does not. Applying this definition to our data we find that 52% of census areas have a value of
-1 and the remaining 48% of areas have a value of 1.
16
Because it is the interaction of two binary variables, ExtensiveBiascm can only capture
the extensive margin of supporter bias. It does not respond to differences in the amount of
investment received by different areas or in the strength of electoral support. To incorporate
intensive margin variation, we construct another measure of supporter bias, IntensiveBiascm,
as the interaction of the difference between the Plan E investment (in per capita terms) carried
out in the census area and the municipal average investment, and the difference between the
PSOE vote shares at the census area level and the municipal aggregate vote share. This variable
is able to capture, at the same time, differences in the intensity of investment and in the presence
of more or less supporters across census areas. Hence, it is a more suitable variable to test our
main hypothesis. Its histogram – provided in Figure 5 – shows substantial heterogeneity across
census areas.
Figure 5







Intensive Margin Bias Measure
Notes: Histogram of our intensive margin measure of bias toward PSOE supporters (details in the text). Our vari-
able is represented in the horizontal axis and has been normalized to have a mean of 0 and standard deviation
equal to 1. The lowest and highest percentiles of the distribution are not displayed.
We can clarify the interpretation of our variables with a simple example. Suppose a munici-
pality with 5,000 inhabitants is divided into two census areas, A and B, with equal populations.
During the previous elections, PSOE obtained a 59% vote share in area A and 47% in area B.
Now suppose that Plan E is rolled out and the municipality in question implements one project
in area A. In this case, our extensive margin measure takes value 1, as this census area received
a project and had PSOE vote share above the municipal average. Moreover, the value of our
extensive bias measure will also be 1 for B because this census area did not receive a project
and had a PSOE vote share below the municipal average. The bias measure is 1 for all areas in
the municipality because this municipal allocation does exhibit PSOE voter bias.
Let us now turn to our continuous bias measure, assuming the project cost 100,000 Euros.
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Hence, Plan E spending per capita is 0 in section B (which received no project), 40 in A, and 20
on average. Our intensive bias measure is computed combining these figures with vote share
deviations from the municipal average. In census area A, PSOE obtained a vote share of 6 points
above the municipal average, so its intensive bias measure will be given by (40− 20)× (59−
53) = 120. In the case of section B, this figure will be (0− 20)× (47− 53) = 120 too. Again,
the allocations and vote shares in both sections are consistent with favouring of PSOE voters.
It is straightforward to see that, if we moved our hypothetical Plan E project from section A to
section B, both measures will change sign. Note also that the measures for A and B are identical
in this simplified example but will in general be different.
Using our bias measures, we specify the structural equation that completes our fuzzy-RD
model as
Biascm =α + f(PSOE WinMarginm) + δPSOEm + γ
′
1
Xcm + ǫcm, (2)
where, as above, c indexes census areas and m indexes municipalities. The outcome variable
Biascm can be either ExtensiveBiascm or IntensiveBiascm, vector Xcm include controls as
defined above, and PSOEm is an indicator for PSOE being in charge of the municipal govern-
ment. To have scale-free measures of bias and facilitate the interpretation of our results, we
standardize both Biascm using their overall mean and standard deviation.
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As usual in regression-discontinuity studies of this kind, estimates are obtained using lo-
cal variation coming from close elections. Hence, the group of municipalities that we use for
identification are electorally competitive by construction. Therefore, our RD results can be
interpreted as measuring supporter targeting in competitive electoral contexts. If supporter
targeting were a specific feature of electorally uncompetitive environments (as suggested, for
example, in Trounstine 2006), then it might be problematic to extrapolate our local result to the
rest of the population.
The running variable measures the distance to or from a PSOE that is seat majority. There-
fore, at the threshold, both the identity of the party with most seats and PSOE’s seat share jump.
Our interpretation of the RD estimates requires assuming the exclusion restriction holds, that
is, changes of PSOE’s seat share at the threshold do not directly affect the propensity of a local
government (whether it is PSOE or another party) to allocate Plan E resources to areas popu-
lated with socialist voters. Conditioning on PSOE’s seat share or on the seat share of the most
voted party does not change our main results, which suggests this assumption is plausible.21
For transparency, in the following section, together with the fuzzy-RD results, we will show
reduced-form estimates, which do not rely on the validity of the exclusion restriction. Then, in
section 4.3, we provide an alternative estimation strategy that avoids some of these issues.
Two final points are due regarding the role of ideology. First, the supporter bias estimated
using RD could pick up parties’ preferences rather than tactical redistribution to supporters.
20Note that it is possible that both of our bias measures contain measurement error. However, measurement
error in the dependent variable will not lead to a bias in coefficients as long as this error is uncorrelated with the
regressors.
21Results are not reported for brevity but are available upon request.
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Second, given our choice of reference party, one may be concerned that our results are only
informative about PSOEmayors. However, using PP, the party with the second-highest number
of mayors in the period, yields the same results (which we omit for brevity).
4.2. Estimation Results
Beforemoving to a formal estimation of the RDmodel, in figure 6 we show how our two bias
measures behave as a function of the PSOE winning margin, with dots representing weighted
averages in bins of size 1% and lines being local linear regression estimates. Because both
measures are standardized, the effect at the discontinuity can be interpreted in terms of standard
deviations of the dependent variable. The graphical evidence indicates that the reduced-form
effect of a PSOE mayor on both supporter bias measures is modest, and well below one-tenth
of a standard deviation.
Fuzzy RD estimates of equation 2 are reported in table 4 for both the extensive and intensive
margin measures and including or excluding controls. In the first two columns, we use the
whole sample and include in estimation a third-degree polynomial in thewinningmargin, while
in the last twowe restrict the sample to observationswithin the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik
(2014) optimal bandwidth, using a linear control function.
Our estimates show that PSOEmayorswhowon the election by a small margin do not favour
areas where relatively more of their supporters live. We interpret this as evidence against our
hypothesis. When using the extensive margin measure, point estimates are very small, with
the largest suggesting a positive effect of 4.9% of a standard deviation. When using the optimal
bandwidth, the magnitude decreases to 1.5% with a corresponding 95% confidence interval of
[−0.29, 0.32]. While the clustered standard errors are relatively large, the confidence intervals
allow us to rule out effects larger that one-third of a standard deviation in either direction. In
column 5 we report reduced-form estimates of the effect of PSOE having the majority of seats
on our measure of bias. These estimates do not rely on the exclusion restriction that PSOE seat
majority has a direct effect on supporter bias other than its direct effect on the likelihood of
electing a PSOE mayor. Hence, they provide a measure of the combined effect of PSOE winning
the majority of seats and having the mayor.
Panel B shows similar estimates using the intensive margin measure, which captures con-
tinuous variation in the amount of investment and the strength of voter support. Taking as
a reference the specification with controls and optimal bandwidth of column 4, again we ob-
serve a small (in this case negative) effect, with a 95% confidence interval of [−0.30, 0.07], again
confirming that PSOE does not appear to significantly target its voters with the allocation of
investment projects. Even if estimates are larger in absolute value than those obtained using
the intensive bias measure, they are more precise, probably owing to the fact that we also ex-
ploit variation in the size of investment and electoral support. Reduced-form point estimates
are slightly smaller in absolute value. For the extensive bias measure, crossing the threshold
results in a statistically insignificant effect of 0.5% of a standard deviation. We then conclude
that switching to a PSOE seat majority has no effect on the allocation of resources to areas with
relatively more PSOE voters.
In the rightmost panels of figure 6, we explore the sensitivity of our RD estimates to differ-
ent bandwidth choices by estimating the model restricting the sample to smaller and smaller
19
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Notes: Left panels: The vertical axis shows the intensive and extensive measures of bias in the allocation of
Plan E projects towards PSOE voters. The horizontal axis shows the PSOE winning margin, defined as the vote
share distance to a seat majority change. Dots are averages in 1% intervals of the winning margin, with each
observation being weighted by the inverse of the number of census area in the municipality, so that all munic-
ipalities have the same weight. The lines are local linear regression estimates using the Epanechnikov kernel
and a bandwidth calculated using Silverman’s rule-of-thumb. All variables are standardized. Right panels: RDD
results from equation 2 for the extensive and intensive margin measures of PSOE supporter bias. Both outcome
variables are normalized to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to one. The solid lines report point
estimates using different bandwidth values as specified in the horizontal axis. 95% confidence intervals based
on clustered s.e. displayed as dashed lines. Vertical lines correspond to Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014)
optimal bandwidths.
bandwidths in increments of 1% of the winning margin. The CCT optimal bandwidth is re-
ported for reference as a vertical line. As the graphs show, point estimates are small for most
magnitudes and smaller than 1/10 of a standard deviation at the CCT bandwidth for either mea-
sure. As we narrow down the bandwidth around the majority threshold, the estimates become
less precise – as shown by the widening of confidence intervals – but remain statistically in-
significant. Given that the increase in the standard errors is due to the sample size reduction
and that point estimates oscillate tightly around zero without a clear pattern, we infer that our
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Table 4
RDD Results - Supporter Bias in Allocation of Investment
Full sample CCT bandwidth Reduced form
A. Extensive Margin Measure
PSOE mayor 0.046 0.049 0.032 0.015
(0.197) (0.200) (0.151) (0.155)
PSOE seats majority 0.005
(0.057)
Bandwidth 0.500 0.500 0.096 0.096 0.096
Controls N Y N Y Y
Obs. 27897 27885 13246 13245 13245
B. Intensive Margin Measure
PSOE mayor -0.108 -0.117 -0.112 -0.116
(0.098) (0.100) (0.091) (0.093)
PSOE seats majority -0.040
(0.032)
Bandwidth 0.500 0.500 0.076 0.076 0.076
Controls N Y N Y Y
Obs. 27527 27517 10816 10816 10816
Notes: Columns 1-4: RDD results for the extensive and intensive margin measures of PSOE supporter bias. Column
5 shows the corresponding reduced-form estimates. Both variables are normalized to have zero mean and standard
deviation equal to 1. Estimates obtained by two-stage least squares using an indicator for PSOE having the seats
majority as an instrument for the indicator for PSOE being in power, while controlling for the winning margin
in the 2007 municipal elections as defined in the text. Columns 1 and 2 use the full sample and third-degree
polynomials in the winning margin, allowed to differ on either side of the threshold. Columns 3 and 4 restrict the
sample to observations within the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) optimal bandwidth around the threshold,
with a linear control function of the winning margin with possibly different slopes on either side. All estimates
are obtained by weighting each census area by the inverse of the number of sections in its municipality. Standard
errors clustered at the municipal level.
baseline estimates are not driven by our particular choice of bandwidth but, instead, reflect the
lack of any appreciable effect in data. Collectively, all results in this section lead us to conclude
that there was no favouring of supporters in the allocation of Plan E projects. If distributive
politics play a role inside cities, then this does not operate through the targeting of supporters’
neighbourhoods.
Our results are robust to using alternative empirical strategies. For example, estimates from
within-city regressions are discussed below. In other specifications, reported in a previous
version of this paper (see Carozzi and Repetto 2017), we aggregated data and ran our RDD
analysis at the municipal level. Reassuringly, these alternatives lead to the same null effects
reported using our preferred RDD specification.
4.3. Alternative Estimation Method
Our main finding is that local politicians do not to target their supporters in the allocation
of investments within cities. We now turn to a complementary estimation strategy leading to
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the same conclusions without relying on municipal close elections. To this end, we estimate
the following model by OLS:
Icm = αm + βV oteShareInccm +
P∑
p=1
δpV oteSharep,cm + γ
′
2
Xcm + ǫcm (3)
where Icm is somemeasure of investment in census area c ofmunicipalitym andV oteShareInc
is the vote share of the incumbent’s party, defined as the ruling party at the time of Plan E incep-
tion in late 2008. β is the coefficient of interest. A positive β implies that areas with relatively
large support for the incumbent receive, on average, more investment. We also include amunic-
ipality fixed effect αm to capture unobserved differences between municipalities. Additionally,
we control for the vote shares of all the main parties – defined in section 2 – and our usual set
of census area characteristics, Xcm, defined above.
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Given that we introduce the vote shares of all major parties as controls (among which there
is always the incumbent’s party), identification of β comes from comparing how much voters
of a given party are rewarded with investment when this party is in power relative to when
it is not. Vote shares also serve as proxies for unobserved determinants of transfers that are
correlated with the electoral preferences of voters. The identifying assumption, as usual, is
that, conditional on all controls and municipal effects, the vote share of the incumbent is mean
independent of the unobserved term ǫcm.
In table B.4 in the appendix, we report estimates using three different measures of invest-
ment as dependent variables: a dummy for receiving at least one project, a variable that counts
the number of projects received and, finally, the ratio of Plan E spending in a given census
area over the municipal total. Results show that all coefficients are negative but very small
in magnitude. A large increase in the vote share of the incumbent by 10 percentage points
is associated with a relatively small decrease in the probability of receiving a project of 0.17
percentage points (see column 3). This coefficient is very small in magnitude and statistically
insignificant. Similar results are found when using alternative measures of investment as de-
pendent variables.
We interpret this as further evidence that local politicians do not target their supporters
when deciding the spatial allocation of resources inside cities. One advantage of this alternative
research strategy is that it does not rely exclusively on close election municipalities which will
necessarily be more electorally competitive than the average. Additionally, it allows to use all
the available information by including all electoral races and, hence, municipalities ruled by
different parties.
22It is worth discussing briefly why we cannot use these measures of investment as dependent variables in our
main RDD analysis. The RDD only provides exogenous variation in the identity of the mayor, not in the strength
of its support in a given census area. Hence, an RDD analysis that uses Icm as a dependent variable would not be
informative because finding a positive correlation between investment and having a PSOE mayor would not be
evidence of the mayor favouring his voters.
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5. Discussion
As reported in the previous sections, we find that incumbents’ supporters were not favoured
in the allocation of Plan E projects within cities. In this section, we start by exploring the elec-
toral consequences of investment projects. Specifically, we show that receiving investment
projects is positively related to future voter turnout, suggesting that investment patterns could
be used to promote the mobilization of voters. Then, we investigate the adequacy of our re-
search design to study distributive politics and show that results are robust to several alternative
specifications and additional analyses.
5.1. Electoral consequences of receiving investment projects
There is at least one margin through which voters respond to project allocations. Specifi-
cally, as panel A of table 5 shows, there is evidence that voters respond to projects in terms of
an increase in turnout.
Table 5
The effect of investment on turnout and national election results
(1) (2)






Turnout 2007 0.309*** 0.312***
(0.02) (0.02)
Controls FE + ctrls. FE + ctrls.
R2 0.88 0.88
Observations 27880 27544
PSOE share 2011 PSOE share 2011





PSOE share 2008 0.729*** 0.729***
(0.016) (0.016)
Controls FE + ctrls. FE + ctrls.
R2 0.94 0.94
Observations 27823 27487
Notes: Census area level regressions including municipal fixed effects in all columns. Panel A reports estimates
for the following OLS regression:
Turnout2011
cm
= βIcm + Turnout
2007
cm
+ αm + γ
′Xcm + ǫcm,
where c indexes census areas and m municipalities. Turnout2011
cm
is the turnout in the 2011 municipal election
in census area m, measured in percentage points. Icm is a measure of Plan E investment which can be either a
project dummy (column 1) or investment per capita (column 2), both measured at the census area level. The fixed
effect αm controls for municipal characteristics. The set of controls Xcm is the same as the one used in equation
2 of section 4. In panel B, the outcome variable is, instead, the vote share of PSOE in the 2011 national election,
and all specifications control for the previous (2008 elections’) PSOE vote share. Standard errors clustered at the
municipal level in all specifications.
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Results are obtained by estimating census-area level regressions of 2011 municipal election
turnout on a measure of investment, 2007 turnout, municipal fixed effects, and the same set
of controls used in our baseline specification.23 Investment is either measured as a project
indicator, taking value 1 if a section received a Plan E project, or as total project cost per capita,
measured at the census area level and standardized. For both investment measures we find a
positive effect on turnout in response to Plan E investments. The coefficients are relatively small
but strongly significant, with receiving a project being associated with an increase in turnout of
almost 0.4 percentage points. Placebo estimates reported in figure B.7 in the appendix validate
the empirical strategy pursued to obtain these estimates by showing that there is no effect of
investment on previous municipal elections’ turnout.
We interpret this result as suggesting that voters become more sensitive to the local level
political agenda when observing the actual policies taking place. It is also evidence that projects
have local electoral effects. Finally, they indicate there may be scope for the use of localized
policies to mobilize voters.
5.2. Other mechanisms and robustness checks
A possible concern is that the investment plan carried out under Plan E is somehow ill-
suited to answer our research question. To start, the national government could have used the
formal approval process to favour certain municipalities. As discussed in section 2, however,
the vast majority of municipalities received the full amount they applied for (see also Mon-
tolio 2018; Tribunal de Cuentas 2013), suggesting that the approval process was, in fact, not
imposing any substantial constraints or limitations on the choice of projects. One might still
be concerned that the national-level PSOE government favoured aligned municipalities, either
to benefit fellow party members or to directly gain votes at the local level. This could give the
national government some ownership in the allocation process. In order to exclude this possi-
bility, we modify our RDD analysis to study whether PSOE local governments received more
total Plan E funding (in per capita terms). Reduced-form results (figure B.8 in the appendix)
suggest that PSOE mayors were not granted any special treatment in the allocation of funds.
To show that our main estimates are not capturing partisan differences in preferences, we
implement an RDD analysis using as dependent variable the fraction of projects belonging to
each of the six most common categories (see table 1) and show that PSOE mayors tend to focus
on the same types of projects as mayors from other parties (estimates are reported in table 6).
Another potential issue relates to the electoral returns of investment projects. Insofar as
Plan E was a national government initiative, its electoral effects may operate through changes
in vote shares in national (rather than municipal) elections. If this were the case, then it would
be unsurprising that we find no targeting of supporters, because municipalities would sim-
ply be unable to claim credit for the Plan E projects. However, census-area level regression
results reported in table 5 show that areas receiving Plan E investment do not experience an
23There are alternative estimation methods available. We can. for example, regress the change in turnout
between 2011 and 2007 on investment and controls. This procedure is similar in spirit to the first difference
estimator used in panel data, but unnecessarily imposes the restriction that the coefficient on the 2007 turnout




No differences in the choice of projects by party
Rehab. Infrastr. Soc./Cult. Sports Energy Roads
PSOE mayor 0.025 0.079 -0.092 -0.038 0.031 0.030
(0.069) (0.086) (0.070) (0.056) (0.049) (0.030)
Mean 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.11 0.10 0.01
Bandwidth 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.07
Obs. 1035 705 882 916 994 705
Notes: RDD results at the municipal level. Estimates are obtained by two-stage least squares using an indicator for
PSOE having the seats majority as an instrument for the indicator for PSOE being in power, while controlling for
the winning margin in the 2007 municipal elections as defined in the text. In each column we use, as dependent
variable, the fraction of projects of a given type carried out in the municipality, restricting the sample to observa-
tions within the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014)’s optimal bandwidth around the threshold, with a linear
control function of the winning margin with possibly different slopes on either side. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
appreciable increase in the vote share of PSOE in the following national election.24 Receiving
a project is associated with a decrease of 0.25-0.38 percentage points in the PSOE vote share
in the following national elections. These estimates are very small, statistically insignificant at
conventional levels, and are evidence against the existence of electoral returns accruing to the
national government.
A potential challenge faced by our empirical strategy lies in that measuring who benefits
directly from investment is difficult. In our analysis, we have implicitly assumed that that the
benefits of receiving a Plan E project are limited to the census area that receives it, hence ruling
out spillovers to neighbouring areas. However, it seems reasonable that at least some kinds of
investments – such as gymnasiums, cultural centres, or sports facilities – provide services that
are enjoyed by a larger constituency.25
To investigate this issue, we perform our analysis again by restricting our attention to types
of projects for which benefits can be considered to be “strictly” localised, in the sense that these
projects aremore likely to benefit their immediate neighbours themost. To classify projects into
this category, we use the descriptions included in the original Plan E data source.26 Secondly,
we retain our initial catch-all definition of projects but we now allow benefits to extend to
100 metre radius circular buffers around the actual project locations. Hence, if a project falls
within a specific census area A but less than 100 metres away from the boundary with another
census area B we consider both A and B to benefit from this investment. Estimates for the bias
measures created using the localised project benefits definition and the 100 metre buffers are
24Vote shares are in percentage points to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients.
25Other investments, like a new sewage system, might even have negative externalities for the closest neigh-
bours but benefiting the municipality as a whole.
26We specifically restrict our attention to i) rehabilitation of public space and ii) improvement in public spaces
and road networks. Although this definition is somewhat arbitrary, some guidance on the selection of projects
with localised benefits is offered by the literature on political budget cycles, which suggests that spending in parks
and roads is very prone to strategic manipulation because of its visibility among voters (see for example Kneebone
and McKenzie 2001; Drazen and Eslava 2010; and Repetto 2018).
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presented in the appendix in table B.6 (panels A and B, respectively). We continue to find small
and insignificant coefficients. Most point estimates indicate the absolute value of the effects
are less than 1/20 of a standard deviation in the bias measure.27 We interpret these estimates
as showing that our main result is robust to different assumptions about the reach of spatial
benefits of local investment.
A complementary result shows further evidence of local benefits of Plan E investments.
Table B.7 in the appendix reports results regressing, respectively, a project indicator and the
total project cost per capita (in logarithms to facilitate interpretation) on the log of census
area population.28 We find a strong and statistically significant correlation between population
and allocation decisions, suggesting that local politicians are mindful of allocating projects to
populated areas, presumably to maximize visibility and impact of these forms of spending.
Local politicians may lack the sophistication or the knowledge needed to use investment
strategically. National-level politicians, who typically handle larger budgets and more profes-
sionalized bureaucracies, may be more experienced and skilled, and hence more aware of the
possible benefits of engaging in distributive politics. While we cannot directly rule out this
possibility, under the assumption that politicians are more sophisticated in larger municipali-
ties, we can use a sample split to further investigate this hypothesis. Panels C and D of table
B.6 replicate our RDD analysis splitting the sample between large and small municipalities, re-
spectively. In order to preserve the significance of the first stage, we split the sample at the
relatively low threshold of 3,000 inhabitants, which roughly corresponds to the first quartile of
the municipal population distribution. Interestingly, the estimates remain small and indistin-
guishably different from zero both in large and in small municipalities. One could be concerned
that our sample split fails to properly sort municipalities with respect to the sophistication of
their local politicians. However, alternative empirical analyses using census-area regressions
including the incumbent’s vote share and focusing on province capitals only also lead to similar
qualitative results.29
To ensure that our results are not exclusively driven by municipalities with little cross-
sectional variation in vote shares, we have also tried restricting the sample to i) municipalities
with 3 or more census areas or ii) municipalities with a high variance in PSOE vote shares across
their geography. In both cases point estimates are small in magnitude and not statistically
significant.
A final note is due regarding different theories on the targets of distributive policies. Our
hypothesis that politicians disproportionately target their supporters with investment is closely
related to the core voters hypothesis in the political economy and political science literature
(Cox and McCubbins, 1986). An alternative hypothesis poses that politicians should instead
target swing voters, that is, voters with weak party preferences who may be willing to “switch
sides” in response to economic favours (Lindbeck andWeibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1995).
27Alternative specifications using more lax definitions of localised benefits or narrower buffer sizes (such as 25
or 50 metres) yield analogous conclusions and are not reported for brevity.
28As before, we include the same controls used in the baseline specification and municipal fixed effects.
29The interested reader can refer to Table B.11 of the previous working paper version of this paper (Carozzi and
Repetto 2017).
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However, it is generally difficult to identify swing voters from electoral data alone.30 While we
show that local governments are not targeting their supporters, we cannot rule out that they
target swing voters instead.
6. Conclusions
Local governments carry out a large share of public investment which, in turn, has long-
standing effects on our cities and towns. In this paper we study whether the allocation of
investment within cities is affected by the spatial distribution of voter support. Between 2009
and 2011, the Spanish government carried out a large scale stimulus program that transferred 12
billion Euros to municipalities to increase infrastructure spending and foster employment. This
policy is well-suited to analyse how local politicians distribute resources inside municipalities.
We find that the spatial allocation of spending within municipalities is not directed to areas
of strong electoral support for the incumbent. This result is robust to allowing investment to
have a disperse spatial impact, to focusing only on those investment projects that are more
likely to yield localised benefits, and to different ways of measuring supporter bias. We there-
fore conclude that previous evidence of tactical distribution of resources between levels of gov-
ernment does not carry over when translating the analysis to groups of voters within local
areas. Complementary results show that areas receiving an investment project experience an
increase in turnout, suggesting that spending might be a way to persuade voters to participate
in local elections.
Our results contribute to the still very incomplete understanding of how electoral condi-
tions and incentives shape the allocation of investments within the city. Despite the importance
of local investment on national spending, the lack of data at a sufficiently disaggregated level
has hampered the study of these issues. Our paper is a first step towards uncovering how dis-
tributive politics operate at the very local level. Several questions remain open, such as whether
or not local politicians target swing voters within their jurisdictions. Further understanding of
the determinants of local investment decisions remains an open topic for future research.
30For an exception in this regard, see Dahlberg and Johansson (2002).
27
References
Ansolabehere, Stephen, and JamesMSnyder. 2006. “Party Control of State Government and
the Distribution of Public Expenditures*.” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108(4): 547–
569.
Baez, Javier Eduardo, Adriana Camacho, Emily Conover, and Román David Zárate.
2012. “Conditional cash transfers, political participation, and voting behavior.” World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper, , (6215).
Beland, Louis-Philippe. 2015. “Political parties and labor-market outcomes: Evidence from
us states.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 7(4): 198–220.
Bracco, Emanuele, Ben Lockwood, Francesco Porcelli, and Michela Redoano. 2015. “In-
tergovernmental grants as signals and the alignment effect: Theory and evidence.” Journal
of Public Economics, 123: 78–91.
Brollo, Fernanda, andTommasoNannicini. 2012. “Tying your enemy’s hands in close races:
the politics of federal transfers in Brazil.” American Political Science Review, 106(04): 742–761.
Calonico, Sebastian, Matias D Cattaneo, and Rocio Titiunik. 2014. “Robust Nonparamet-
ric Confidence Intervals for Regression-Discontinuity Designs.” Econometrica, 82(6): 2295–
2326.
Carozzi, Felipe, and Luca Repetto. 2017. “Distributive Politics Inside the City? The Political
Economy of Spain’s Plan E.” SERC-CEP Working Paper n. 212.
Case, Anne. 2001. “Election goals and income redistribution: Recent evidence from Albania.”
European Economic Review, 45(3): 405–423.
Cattaneo, Matias D,Michael Jansson, and XinweiMa. 2016. “rddensity: Manipulation test-
ing based on density discontinuity.” The Stata Journal (ii), 1–18.
Cox, Gary W. 2009. “Swing voters, core voters, and distributive politics.” Political Representa-
tion, 342–356.
Cox, GaryW, and Mathew DMcCubbins. 1986. “Electoral politics as a redistributive game.”
Journal of Politics, 48(2): 370–389.
Curto-Grau, Marta, Albert Solé-Ollé, and Pilar Sorribas-Navarro. 2018. “Does Electoral
Competition Curb Party Favoritism?” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics.
Dahlberg, Matz, and Eva Johansson. 2002. “On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent
Governments.” The American Political Science Review, 96(2): 27–40.
Dixit, Avinash, and John Londregan. 1995. “Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency.”
The American Political Science Review, 89(4): 856–866.
28
Drazen, Allan, and Marcela Eslava. 2010. “Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spend-
ing: Theory and evidence.” Journal of development economics, 92(1): 39–52.
Ferreira, Fernando, and Joseph Gyourko. 2009. “Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from
US Cities*.” The Quarterly journal of economics, 124(1): 399–422.
Fiva, Jon H, Olle Folke, and Rune J Sørensen. 2018. “The power of parties: evidence from
close municipal elections in Norway.” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 120(1): 3–30.
Folke, Olle. 2014. “Shades of brown and green: party effects in proportional election systems.”
Journal of the European Economic Association, 12(5): 1361–1395.
Gelman, Andrew, and Guido Imbens. 2014. “Why high-order polynomials should not be
used in regression discontinuity designs.” National Bureau of Economic Research.
Golden, Miriam, and Brian Min. 2013. “Distributive politics around the world.” Annual Re-
view of Political Science, 16: 73–99.
Imbens, GuidoW., and Thomas Lemieux. 2008. “Regression discontinuity designs: A guide
to practice.” Journal of Econometrics, 142(2): 615–635.
Kneebone, Ronald D, andKenneth JMcKenzie. 2001. “Electoral and partisan cycles in fiscal
policy: An examination of Canadian provinces.” International Tax and Public Finance, 8(5-
6): 753–774.
Lee, David S. 2008. “Randomized experiments from non-random selection in U.S. House elec-
tions.” Journal of Econometrics, 142(2): 675–697.
Levitt, Steven D., and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1995. “Political Parties and the Distribution of
Federal Outlays.” American Journal of Political Science, 39(4): 958–980.
Lindbeck, Assar, and Jörgen W Weibull. 1987. “Balanced-budget redistribution as the out-
come of political competition.” Public choice, 52(3): 273–297.
Manacorda, Marco, Edward Miguel, and Andrea Vigorito. 2011. “Government transfers
and political support.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3(3): 1–28.
McCrary, Justin. 2008. “Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity
design: A density test.” Journal of Econometrics, 142(2): 698–714.
Migueis, Marco. 2013. “The effect of political alignment on transfers to Portuguese munici-
palities.” Economics & Politics, 25(1): 110–133.
Montolio, Daniel. 2018. “The effects of local infrastructure investment on crime.” Labour Eco-
nomics.
OECD. 2013. Investing Together: Working Effectively across Levels of Government. OECD pub-
lishing.
29
Pettersson-Lidbom, Per. 2008. “Do parties matter for economic outcomes? A regression-
discontinuity approach.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(5): 1037–1056.
Pop-Eleches, Cristian, and Grigore Pop-Eleches. 2012. “Targeted government spending
and political preferences.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 7(3): 285–320.
Repetto, Luca. 2018. “Political budget cycles with informed voters: evidence from Italy.” The
Economic Journal.
Solé-Ollé, Albert, and Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal. 2013. “Do political parties matter for
local land use policies?” Journal of Urban Economics, 78: 42–56.
Solé-Ollé, Albert, and Pilar Sorribas-Navarro. 2008. “The effects of partisan alignment on
the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Differences-in-differences estimates for Spain.”
Journal of Public Economics, 92(12): 2302–2319.
Strömberg, David. 2004. “Radio’s impact on public spending.” The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 189–221.
Tribunal de Cuentas. 2013. “Informe de fiscalizacion del Fondo Estatal de Inversion Local.”
n.982/2013.
Trounstine, Jessica. 2006. “Dominant regimes and the demise of urban democracy.” Journal
of Politics, 68(4): 879–893.
Voigtlaender, Nico, and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2014. “Highway to Hitler.” NBER Working
Paper series 20150.
Weingast, Barry R, Kenneth A Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen. 1981. “The Political
Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics.” Journal of
Political Economy, 89(4): 642–64.
Wright, Gavin. 1974. “The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: An Econometric Analy-
sis.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 56(1): 30–38.
30
Appendix
Appendix A. Data sources
Municipality codes and names; population
To have a reliable list of municipality names and official municipality and province codes,
we use the INE list of all Spanish municipalities for the years 2001-2011.
URL: http://www.ine.es/daco/daco42/codmun/codmun11/11codmunmapa.htm
Population data at the municipal level is available from 1996 onwards at the Padrón continuo
municipal de habitantes:
URL: http://www.ine.es/dynt3/inebase/es/index.html?padre=517&dh=1
Census area maps (shapefiles)
To be able to connect electoral data (available at the census area level) and the investment
projects (geolocated with latitude and longitude), we need shapefiles with the borders of each
census area. Since boundaries usually change over time, we need to have updated maps for
each municipal election year (2007 and 2011) before and after the Plan E investment program.
The 2011 shapefile with all census areas is freely available at the following url:
URL: http://www.ine.es/censos2011_datos/cen11_datos_resultados_seccen.htm
We also purchased the map for 2007 directly from INE, which we use as a reference in all
the empirical analysis. In order to be able to assign the data from the 2001 Census to the 2007
census areas, we also bought the shapefile map for 2001 from the same source.
Plan E Investment data
The Plan E data on investment projects with geographical coordinates and amount were
downloaded by hand from:
URL: http://www.seap.minhap.gob.es/fondosinversionlocal/utilidades/geolocalizacion-de-
proyectos.html
and saved as a .csv directly. Each investment project comes with, among other variables, the
geographical coordinates. Those coordinates are then used, together with the 2007 shapefile, in
ArcGIS to overlay the investment project data (as a “point layer”) with the census area polygons
as described below.
Electoral data
The electoral data are at the "Mesa" level (= polling stations, within-municipality) for several
municipal and national elections. Data are then aggregated at the census area level in order to
have the same level of aggregation of the shapefiles and the Census data. Each census area
usually contains just a handful of polling stations, so the amount of aggregation is minimal.
URL: http://www.infoelectoral.interior.es/min/areaDescarga.html?method=search
There, we downloaded electoral results for the 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 municipal election,
plus the 2000, 2004 and 2008 national elections, both at the disaggregated “mesa” level and at
the municipal level.
Those data lack information on the identity of the mayor in each year and on the corre-




Census area data We downloaded some variables, used as controls in the empirical anal-
ysis, from the 2001 Population census directly from the INE website:
URL: http://www.ine.es/censo/es/inicio.jsp
We obtain population data at the census area level for 2007 and 2011 from:
URL: http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=/t20/e245/&file=inebase&L=0




Our final dataset is based on the 2007 census areas for which we have information on the ge-
ographical boundaries (and coordinates). These areas are those that appear in the 2007 shapefile
from INE. Of the 35,323 census areas in this dataset, we drop 5,833 belonging to municipalities
with only one census area. Then, we drop municipalities where the mayor does not belong
to any of the 9 largest parties, as defined in section 3 in the main text. By doing this, we lose
1,405 additional areas. Finally, we drop the municipality of “"Mañón”, because there is a conflict
between the map – which has it divided in two census areas – and the electoral data, where it
appears as having just one.
Regarding the projects data, the original data has 57,850 of them but 15,682 of them are
incorrectly geo-located. We drop 6,574 projects that have no localised benefits, such as those
related tomodernization of the electronic equipment ofmunicipal buildings or to sewageworks.
With the help of a research assistant, we went through all the remaining projects with incorrect
geo-coding and we were able to hand-code roughly one-fifth of them. ArcGIS is used to assign
all the 38,353 correctly geo-localised projects (which are points with geographical coordinates)
to census areas (areas with polygon boundaries).
After this step, we have a dataset at the census area level. We replace all the Plan E vari-
ables (such as the dummy for receiving at least one project) with zeros if a given census area
did not receive any project. In the special case in which we observe, in our sample, that the
whole municipality carried out no investment projects at all, we replace all variables as missing
instead. This is the case for only 28 municipalities. Given that the cost per capita variable has
some large outliers, we replace as missing all observations in the top 1% of the cost per capita
distribution when constructing our extensive bias measure.
Construction of the final dataset
The basis of our dataset are the 35,323 census areas in which Spain was divided as of 2007,
as they appear in the INE shapefile. To assign investment projects – which come with latitude
and longitude – to census areas we need information on the exact boundaries of each area,
obtained from a shapefile for all 2007 census areas. Using ArcGIS 10.3.1, we overlay the point
layer (that is, the dataset of geolocated project points) to the map of census areas. ArcGIS then
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calculates how many project points fall into each census areas, and the total cost. Finally, it
saves the resulting dataset as a comma-separated values file that can be read by STATA.
The electoral data for 2007 are then directly merged using a unique census area identifier
(labelled CUSEC in the raw data) to the main dataset. A slight complication arises when one
tries to merge information for other years (such as, for instance, the 2001 Population Census
data or electoral data for other years) to the 2007 census area dataset, because the boundaries
of the census areas change over time. To be able to merge data from other years with the 2007
dataset, we create, for each year in which a map shapefile is available (2001 and 2011), a dataset
that links the census areas boundaries to the 2007 ones. These two datasets allow us to directly
link data for 2001 and 2011 to the 2007 census areas.
As an illustration on how census areas are linked across different years, consider the case in
which the 2001 census area A is divided in two areas in 2007, Bwith surface 9/10 of the original
one, and C with surface 1/10. Imagine that we want to have the variable “number of foreigners”,
only available for 2001, for all the 2007 census areas. Assume, for the sake of the example, that
the number of foreigners living in area A was 100 in 2001. To assign this number to the new
2007 boundaries, we simply assume that those people are uniformly located in space. Hence,
we assign 90 of them to area B and the remaining 10 to area C .31 This simple procedure allows
us to obtain a single cross-section for the 2007 census areas with several variables from other
years, with the advantage of having kept the geographical boundaries fixed.
31For the years in which no shapefile is available, we first merge to the closest year available and then apply
the described procedure.
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Appendix B. Additional results
This appendix includes a set of descriptives and complementary results - in the forms of
figures, tables and images - which we are referred to in the paper. Table B.1 shows descriptive
statistics at the municipal level.
Table B.1
Descriptive statistics - Municipal level
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
PSOE mayor 0.50 0.50 0.000 1.000
PP mayor 0.33 0.47 0.000 1.000
N. of census areas 13.72 70.29 2.000 2381.000
Seats in the municipal council 14.25 4.74 9.000 57.000
Plan E spending, per capita 207.05 71.42 0.000 303.681
Unemployment in 2007 0.07 0.03 0.012 0.228
Unemployment in 2008 0.10 0.03 0.020 0.280
Unemployment in 2009 0.12 0.04 0.017 0.309
Unemployment in 2010 0.12 0.04 0.022 0.332
Unemployment in 2011 0.14 0.05 0.027 0.349
Population 19,527 89852 1099 3132463
Observations 2046
Notes: Averages for some municipal-level characteristics of interest for the 2,046 municipalities in the sample.
Electoral figures refer to the 2007 municipal election. Due to lack of municipal information on active population
at the municipal level, unemployment is calculated as number of registered unemployed divided by the population
aged 15-65.
Table B.2
Descriptives Statistics for Investment Projects
All FEIL FEESL CN
A. All projects
Cost in million euros 12308 7933 4232 143
Participating municipalities 8097 8058 8067 713
Average cost of a project (thousand EUR) 213 260 168 69
N. of projects 57850 30566 25214 2070
B. Only correctly geocoded projects
Cost in million euros 9376 6270 3106
Participating municipalities 7210 6879 8023
Average cost of a project (thousand EUR) 244 292 184
N. of projects 38353 21460 16893
Notes: Descriptive statistics for investment projects. Panel A uses the universe of Plan E projects and Panel B
restricts attention to projects with correct geo-location in our sample.
Table B.2 presents descriptives for all projects and projects in our sample, respectively. The
difference between the two samples corresponds to projects for which geo-coding is not avail-
able and projects which we exclude because they clearly yield no geographically precise effect
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on voters (for instance, improvements to the city hall internet connection, etc.). In our sample
we also drop all projects of the CN investment program, because it was a plan meant to dis-
tribute resources to provincial rather than municipal authorities. Likewise, we exclude projects
executed by associations of municipalities as we cannot attribute a single incumbent party to
these associations. We have a total of 38,353 correctly geocoded projects roughly equally di-
vided between the two Plan E programs (FEIL and FEESL). Our sample of correctly geocoded
projects covers 7,210 municipalities (90% of the total). The average project costs 244 thousand
Euros, with projects being more costly in FEIL than FEESL. Comparing panels A and B of Table
B.2 we can note that projects that are not in our sample are slightly cheaper on average.
Table B.3 presents first-stage estimates corresponding to equation 1. In the first two columns
we use the whole sample and include in estimation a third-degree polynomial in the winning
margin, while in the last two we restrict the sample to observations within the Calonico, Catta-
neo and Titiunik (2014) optimal bandwidth and use a linear control function. Each observation
is weighted by the inverse of the number of census areas in the municipality so that all mu-
nicipalities have the same weight. Columns 2 and 4 also include the set of controls outlined in
section 4. We observe in all columns that when PSOE wins a seat majority by a narrow margin
there is a 30 - 38% increase in the probability of having a PSOE mayor. Note that this jump is
similar to the one observed in figure 3 in the paper.
Table B.3
First-Stage Regressions
Full sample CCT bandwidth
PSOE seats majority 0.312*** 0.307*** 0.380*** 0.372***
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053)
Controls N Y N Y
F-statistic 36.11 35.15 50.90 49.42
Obs. 28043 28031 13315 13314
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator taking value 1 if a municipality has a PSOEmayor. Main independent
variable of interest is a dummy taking value 1 if the PSOE winning margin is positive. All specifications control
for the vote share distance to PSOE seat majority in the 2007 municipal elections. Columns 1 and 2 use the full
sample and third degree polynomials, allowed to differ at either side of the threshold. Columns 3 and 4 restrict the
sample to a bandwidth around the threshold estimated as in Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014) and includes
a linear control function in the winning margin, with slope allowed to differ on either side of the threshold.
Table B.4 provides OLS estimates of the effect of the mayor’s vote share on different mea-
sures of investments (β in equation 3 in the text). The investment measures are i) a dummy
taking value 1 if the census area received a Plan E project, ii) the number of Plan E projects
received by a census area, and iii) the fraction of total resources to the municipality allocated
in a census area. The effect of mayoral support on investment is estimated using OLS with
municipal fixed effects.
In table B.6, we report results for several robustness checks discussed in section 5.
Figure B.7 presents placebo estimates from the same turnout regression estimated in table
5, reporting the baseline result for 2011 turnout as reference and using, as dependent variable,





Project 1/0 Project 1/0 Project 1/0
Vote Share Inc. (2007) -0.039 -0.024 -0.017
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R
2 0.33 0.28 0.33
Observations 27892 27903 27892
N. projects N. projects N. projects
Vote Share Inc. (2007) -0.159 -0.059 -0.067
(0.14) (0.12) (0.13)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R
2 0.38 0.34 0.38
Observations 27892 27903 27892
Inv. share Inv. share Inv. share
Vote Share Inc. (2007) -0.006 -0.006 -0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Controls FE + geo ctrls. FE+ elect. ctrls. FE+ full ctrls.
R
2 0.45 0.44 0.45
Observations 27892 27903 27892
Notes: Census-area level regressions including municipal fixed effects in all specifications. Dependent variables
are measures of census-area level investments in all specifications. The first row uses a project dummy (taking
value 1 if the census area received a project), the second row uses the number of projects received by the census
area, and the third row uses the fraction of all municipal Plan E spending allocated to that census area. Standard
errors clustered at the municipal level.
characteristics, we control for lagged turnout in each specification (except in the 1999 regres-
sion, where we have no data on the previous election results). As expected, regressing pre-Plan
E turnout on investment shows no statistically significant correlation except in one case where
we find a relatively small and negative effect. Overall, estimates are much smaller in absolute
value than the baseline 2011 effect, mitigating concerns that Plan E investment is correlated
with other, unobserved, census-area level counfounders than could bias our results.
Results reported in table B.7 indicate that more populated areas within a municipality re-
ceive more projects. To show this, we estimate census area level regressions of measures of
investment (a project dummy and log total investment, respectively) on a municipal fixed ef-
fect, the log of population and our set of controls. The table reports the log population coef-
ficients. For both investment measures we find strong and significant effects of population on
the probability of receiving a project (column 1) and on total investment (column 2). Column
1 indicates that areas with 1% larger populations have 0.18% more probability of receiving a
project. The estimate in column 2, obtained using only census areas receiving projects, show
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Table B.5
Alternative Estimation Strategy - Alignment Heterogeneity
Project 1/0 N. projects Inv. share
A. Alignment Interaction
Vote Share Inc. (2007) 0.032 -0.070 -0.007
(0.08) (0.23) (0.02)
Vote Share Inc. × Aligned -0.114 0.007 0.010
(0.17) (0.50) (0.06)
Observations 27892 27892 27892
Project 1/0 N. projects Inv. share
B. Unaligned Municipalities
Vote Share Inc. (2007) 0.000 -0.153 -0.017
(0.08) (0.23) (0.03)
Observations 14131 14131 14131
Controls FE+ full ctrls FE+ full ctrls FE+ full ctrls
Notes: Census-area level regressions including municipal fixed effects in all specifications. Dependent variables
are measures of census-area level investments in all specifications. In the first column, we use a project dummy
(taking value 1 if the census area received a project); in the second column we use the number of projects received
by the census area; and in the third column we use the fraction of all municipal Plan E spending allocated to that
census area. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.
that a 1% increase in population is associated with 0.33% more spending.
Finally, figure B.8 displays a reduced-form RDD plot usingmunicipal Plan E funds per capita
as our outcome variable. We can observe from the graph that there is no discontinuity in the
amount of received Plan E funds when comparing municipalities where PSOE narrowly lost
a majority with municipalities where PSOE narrowly won. We only report this reduced form
graph for ease of exposition but fuzzy-RD estimates adjusting for the jump in the first stage
also lead to very small and insignificant coefficients.
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Figure B.7
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Notes: Regression estimates from the specification used in table 5 and corresponding confidence intervals. The
dependent variable, turnout in the different municipal elections, is regressed on a project dummy, a set of controls
(including lagged turnout) and a municipal level fixed effect. Standard errors used to create confidence intervals
are clustered at the municipal level.
Figure B.8
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Notes: The vertical axis measures the amount of Plan E funding per capita received by a municipality. Horizontal
axis measures PSOE Winning Margin calculated following the method outlined in section 4.1. Dots represent
averages within 1% bins of the winning margin. The lines are local linear regression estimates obtained using an




Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Projects with Localized Benefits
PSOE mayor 0.049 0.015 -0.142 -0.095
(0.200) (0.155) (0.087) (0.076)
F-Stat 35.2 49.4 35.2 39.8
Bandwidth 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.08
Obs. 27885 13245 27517 12048
B. 100 Metre Buffers
PSOE mayor -0.048 -0.041 0.038 -0.008
(0.181) (0.129) (0.056) (0.039)
F-Stat 35.2 55.8 35.2 49.4
Bandwidth 0.50 0.11 0.50 0.10
Obs. 27885 14687 27522 13079
C. Large Municipalities
PSOE mayor 0.006 0.008 -0.053 -0.086
(0.314) (0.246) (0.168) (0.149)
F-Stat 10.0 14.9 10.0 11.5
Bandwidth 0.50 0.09 0.50 0.08
Obs. 26927 12166 26559 10923
D. Small Municipalities
PSOE mayor 0.141 0.032 -0.149 -0.147
(0.262) (0.236) (0.102) (0.096)
F-Stat 63.8 70.0 63.8 67.4
Bandwidth 0.50 0.12 0.50 0.11
Obs. 958 492 958 459
Notes: RDD results for the extensive and intensive margin measures of PSOE supporter bias. Both variables are
normalized to have zero mean and standard deviation equal to 1. RDD estimates are obtained by two-stage least
squares using an indicator for PSOE having the seats majority as an instrument for the indicator for PSOE being in
power, while controlling for the winning margin in the 2007 municipal elections as defined in the text. Columns 1
and 2 use the full sample and third-degree polynomials in thewinningmargin, allowed to differ on either side of the
threshold. Columns 3 and 4 restrict the sample to observations within the Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik (2014)’s
optimal bandwidth around the threshold, with a linear control function of the winning margin with possibly
different slopes on either side. Panel A uses only project types considered to have strongly localised geographical
benefits (see text). Panel B uses, as outcome variables, measures obtained assuming that investment projects affect
census areas within 100 metres of the geo-coded location. Panel C and D restrict the sample to municipalities
larger or smaller than 3,000 inhabitants (respectively). First-stage F-statistics and bandwidth around the threshold
are indicated alongside observations in the table foot. All estimates are obtained by weighting each census area
by the inverse of the number of sections in its municipality. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.
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Table B.7
Project Allocation & Census Area Population
Project 1/0 Log(Investment)
Log population (2007) 0.185*** 0.334***
(0.014) (0.049)




Notes: Census area level regressions including municipal fixed effects in all specifications. In column 1 the depen-
dent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the census area received a Plan E project. In column 2 the dependent
variable is the log of the total investment received, excluding census areas receiving no projects. Both columns
include the set of controls described in section 4. Standard errors clustered at the municipal level.
40
Figure B.9
Examples of Plan E Investments
Restoration and accessibility improvement in nearby streets in the urban spaces around Eresma, Toro and Tormes
streets in the municipality of Leganés, south of Madrid. The total cost of this project was € 3,200,000, financed by
Plan E through FEIL.
Environmental adaptation and improvement in the low areas of Barrio del Villablanca, in the municipality of
Almería, in Southern Spain. The total cost of this project was € 4,864,380 financed by Plan E through FEESL.
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Figure B.10
Plan E Signboard template
Notes: Signboard template for Plan E projects. From top to bottom, the signboard must contain: name of the
municipality, the contractor, and the project; the amount spent and the expected completion time; a Plan E logo;
the government logo.
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